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EDITH GREENE*
I
INTRODUCTION
In 1985, a twelve-person Baltimore jury awarded Debra Sterling $25,000
in compensatory damages and $1,501,000 in punitive damages after she had
been handcuffed and thrown to the ground outside a drug store by a security
guard who believed that she had shoplifted a $1.49 soda.' The trial lasted for
approximately two weeks during which time medical and psychiatric experts
testified about the physical and emotional damages suffered by the plaintiff.
The jury took one and a half hours to decide liability and compensatory
damages in favor of Ms. Sterling; after a second trial for punitive damages, the
jury deliberated eight and a half minutes before returning verdicts of $1000
against the security guard and $1,500,000 against his employer, Globe
Security Systems.
By contrast, in 1987 a six-person Colorado Springs jury awarded $2 to
Patricia James and $502 to each of her two teenage daughters after security
guards at K-Mart twisted the daughters' arms behind their backs, threw them
against a wall, and strip-searched them, believing that the daughters had
shoplifted. 2 The plaintiffs in this case were unable to afford expert medical
or psychological testimony. The jury awarded nothing in punitive damages.
Anecdotal accounts such as these serve to illustrate the possibility for
uneven compensation in the civil justice system and have been used by critics
to argue that jury verdicts and awards are capricious, spurious, and
unpredictable.3 However, such claims usually fail to analyze the jury
decisionmaking processes that yield such varying results. This lacuna exists
because very little is known about the ways in which jurors attempt to
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1. Sterling v. Beckenheimer's, Inc., No. 85007033-CL29360 (Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
Nov. 19, 1987), rev'd sub. nom. Globe Security Systems Co. v. Sterling, 79 Md. App. 303, 556 A.2d
731, 732 (1989) (reversible error to admit expert psychiatric testimony which usurped the jury's role
as determiner of witness credibility).
2. James v. K-Mart, No. 86CV2422 (FourthJudicial District Court, Colorado Springs, Sept. 15,
1987).
3. SeeJ. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 110-16 (1949).
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compensate a plaintiff for injuries that result from the defendant's actions-
the ways in which jurors attempt to make an injured plaintiff whole.4
In contrast to our knowledge of the products of decisionmaking in civil
litigation,5 we know very little about the process of jury decisionmaking. And
yet, claims of randomness and capriciousness seem to imply more than
misdirected outcomes. Implicit in this argument is an allegation that the task
of allocating damages is outside the realm of jurors' competence. 6
This article will review the small body of literature on the process of
determining damages in civil lawsuits, and lend an empirical foundation to the
ongoing debate over the competence of the jury to make reasoned and
equitable damage awards. Part II describes the freedom the jury has
historically been accorded in damage award determinations. Part III details
the means by which this issue has been studied, including comparisons
between judges and juries, archival analyses, and interview and mock jury
studies. Part IV describes the relevant findings from this research. Finally,
the competence of jurors to assess damages and return reasoned verdicts is
considered.
II
JURORS' FREEDOM TO DETERMrNE DAMAGES
One reason that the process by which jurors assess damages has largely
escaped academic scrutiny is that jurors have historically been accorded vast
freedom in this area. 7 Judges often send jurors to deliberate with a minimum
of guidance as to how their damage calculations should proceed.8 Jurors are
frequently instructed that the law has provided no fixed standards by which to
measure pain and suffering, for example. In short, few rules specify how this
game is to be played.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that although normative
issues clearly underlie decisions about compensation, "there is . . . no
standard man, no reasonable man afoot in the law of damages."-9 Thus, it may
be extremely difficult to determine an adequate and appropriate amount of
money to compensate an injured person for feelings of pain and suffering, or
for lost biological functioning, professional standing, or business
opportunity. Further, identical injuries may have radically different effects on
different plaintiffs: A dancer who loses a finger still has two feet; a cellist who
loses a finger has lost her career. Because we lack the ability to attach price
4. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 160
(1958).
5. See, e.g., A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK
COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985); M. PETERSON, COMPENSATION OF INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN
COOK COUNTY (1984); M. PETERSON, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1985).
6. Cf J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 116-22.
7. Kalven, supra note 4, at 160-64.
8. J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA (1988); M. SELVIN & L. PIcus, THE DEBATE OVER JURY
PERFORMANCE: OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE (1987).
9. Kalven, supra note 4, at 160.
[Vol. 52: No. 4
JURIES AND DAMAGE AWARDS
tags to given functions and talents, the translation of social wrongs into
dollars and cents is problematic, at best.' 0
The law does provide some rudimentary ground rules for these
determinations by breaking the loss into discernible components. For
example, jurors in negligence cases often hear testimony concerning medical
expenses, economic loss, and pain and suffering and could use these
categories as an organizing framework to guide their deliberations.
Nevertheless, complexity remains because jurors are often asked to make a
decision on the basis of incomplete and conflicting evidence. The jury is
essentially asked to guess the future:' t "How long will the pain last?"; "How
fully will the plaintiff recover?"; "How much will the dollar be worth in the
future?"; "How valuable will this child's life be?" Plaintiffs and defendants
will have quite divergent responses to these questions.
With recent concerns over the litigation explosion' 2 and calls for tort
reform,' 3 interest in jury damage awards has reappeared. Early work in this
area, conducted by social scientists and legal scholars, attempted to define the
jury's task in descriptive terms.' 4 More recently, psychologists and other
social scientists have conducted a number of empirical studies on the
processes of awarding compensation.' 5 A representative sampling of this
work will be described in light of the methodologies developed to study the
issue.
10. R. MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE THE BLACK Box: TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF CIVIL
JURY BEHAVIOR 31-34 (1987).
11. Kalven, supra note 4.
12. See, e.g., Civiletti, Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: IrrationalJustice, Veedless Delays, Excessive
Costs, 46 MD. L. REV. 40 (1986); Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3
(1986); Saks, If There be a Crisis, How Shall We Know It?, 46 MD. L. REV. 63 (1986).
13. The insurance industry has lobbied for legislative reforms to end what it calls a crisis in the
civil justice system. Examples of the proposed reforms include caps or ceilings placed on the
amounts jurors can award, restricted punitive damage awards, and restructured contingency fee
arrangements. Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols,
Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269; Daniels & Martin,
Jury V/erdicts and the "Crisis" in Civil Justice, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 321, 323 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959); Broeder,
Plaintiff's Family Status as Affecting Juror Behavior: Some Tentative Insights, 14 J. PUB. L. 131 (1965);
Kalven, supra note 4.
15. See, e.g., Goodman, Greene & Loftus, Runaway Verdicts or Reasoned Determinations: Mock Juror
Strategies in Awarding Damages, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 285 (1989); Hans & Ermann, Responses to Corporate
Versus Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAVIOR 151 (1989); Horowitz & Bordens, The Effects of
Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated CivilJury Decisions, 12 LAW
& HUM. BEHAVIOR 209 (1988); Kaplan & Miller, Group Decision Waking and Normative Versus
Informational Influence: Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned Decision Rule, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 306 (1987); Raitz, Greene, Goodman & Loftus, Determining Damages: The Influence of
Expert Testimony on Jurors' Decision Making (in press, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. (1990)); Sonaike, The Influence
ofJury Deliberation on Juror Perception of Trial, Credibility, and Damage Awards, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 889;
Wasserman & Robinson, Extra-legal Influences, Group Processes, and Jury Decision-making: A Psychological
Perspective, 12 N.C.C.U. LJ. 96 (1980).
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III
JURY DAMAGE AWARDS: How THEY HAVE BEEN STUDIED
A. Comparing Juries and Judges
The first large-scale study of jury decisionmaking in civil lawsuits was
conducted by the Jury Project at the University of Chicago Law School in the
1950's.1 6 These researchers evaluated the jury's decisionmaking competence
in light of shadow verdicts delivered by judges in the same cases. They
obtained reports of actual cases tried to the jury, the jury's liability and
damage verdicts in each case, and a statement from the judge as to how he
would have decided the case had he been the sole arbiter.
In personal injury cases, the judge and jury agreed on liability 79 percent
of the time. 17 More interesting, however, was the fact that the judges and
juries disagreed considerably on damage awards. In 52 percent of the cases in
which judge and jury agreed that the defendant was liable, jurors awarded
more in damages; in 37 percent of cases where the defendant's liability was
agreed upon, jurors awarded less; and in only 9 percent of cases did jury and
judge agree on the level of damages. Overall, jury awards averaged 20
percent higher than judges' awards.' 8
The authors made some further observations on the issue of jury
competence. In their study, judges were asked to classify each criminal case as
easy or difficult to understand. In theory, any propensity toward
misunderstanding by jurors should be more apparent in cases that judges
rated difficult. Jury/judge disagreement would likely manifest itself in these
cases. The data showed otherwise: The level of disagreement (on guilt
verdicts) was nearly identical for easy and difficult cases. Assuming that these
data would apply to civil cases, Kalven suggested that the intellectual
incompetence of the civil jury had been vastly exaggerated. 19
Data from the Chicago Jury Project have withstood the test of time and
have formed the foundation for much recent debate about the competence of
both criminal and civil juries. The data provide little information, however,
about the intricacies of applying law to facts in order to reach a verdict. The
Chicago study has little to say about the ways in which verdicts are reached
and awards determined. These limitations also apply to large-scale archival
analyses, a second means of assessing jury performance. However, much
information about trends in jury awards can be gleaned from these large case
studies.
16. See, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Broeder, The University of
Chicago Jury Project, supra note 14; Kalven, supra note 4, at 159; Kalven, The Dzgnity of the Civil Jury, 50
VA. L. REV. 1055 (1964).
17. Kalven, supra note 16, at 1065. In 44% of the cases, both groups found for the plaintiff and
in 35% of the cases both found for the defendant. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1066-68.
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B. Archival Analyses
Archival studies ofjury decisionmaking involve statistical analyses of large
data sets, often culled from jury reporting services. The virtue of archival
studies is that they allow researchers to evaluate the impact of different factors
on a particular variable, such as the size of the compensatory damage award.
One archival study examined over 9000 civil cases tried in Cook County,
Illinois, and over 5000 cases tried in San Francisco between 1960 and 1979.20
These researchers were interested in how factors such as (1) the attributes of
the defendant (an individual versus a corporation), (2) the plaintiff's degree
of negligence, and (3) the delay between the time of injury and trial affected
damage awards. Their data showed that juries returned larger awards against
corporate defendants despite their instructions that the defendant's resources
should not influence the size of an award;2' that even in states without
comparative negligence standards, jurors discounted the awards of partially
negligent plaintiffs; 22 and that juries provided some prejudgment interest to
compensate the plaintiff for the delay between injury and trial. 2 3
An archival analysis can reveal that these factors affect the awards, but it
cannot explain why they affect the awards. Thus, the researchers could
determine that jurors do indeed discount damages in accordance with the
plaintiff's negligence, but were unable to determine why this was so or how
jurors reached this conclusion. For example, did jurors agree on a sum to
compensate the plaintiff for her injuries and then reduce the amount in
accordance with their assessment of her comparative negligence? Or did they
begin their deliberations with a discussion of her role in the accident? Did
they agree on an exact percentage figure to represent her share of the blame?
Did their beliefs about her negligence affect their determination of punitive
damages? Because archival analyses cannot answer these detailed questions,
they are of limited usefulness when the process of decisionmaking is of interest,
and questions such as "Why?" and "In what way?" are paramount.
C. Interviewing Jurors
Recently, social scientists and lawyers have begun to interview jurors
subsequent to their jury service and have been able to probe the processes of
decisionmaking. These studies have often been conducted after highly
publicized, complex, and/or lengthy trials. 24
20. Hammitt, Carroll & Relies, Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751, 752
(1985). The study also analyzed approximately 200 verdicts taken from a sample of automobile
insurance claims closed with some payment to the insured during a two-week period in 1977. Id. at
753.
21. Id. at 754.
22. Id. at 756-57.
23. Id. at 758-61.
24. See, e.g., A. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY
(1984); T. PETZINGER, OIL AND HONOR: THE TEXACO-PENNZOIL WARS 399-408, 483-84 (1987); M.
SELVIN & L. PicUs, supra note 8. See generally Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 886 (1983) (discussing potentially adverse effects of exposing the deliberative process to public
criticism).
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Austin 25 interviewed two sets of jurors in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland
Electric Illuminating Co., 26 in which the city sued the rival of its municipal utility
for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 2 7 When questioned about
calculations of damages, jurors in the first group related that they never
discussed damages in their deliberations, and did not retain details about the
damages testimony. Austin discerned from jurors' responses that they lacked
interest in issues related to damages because they did not expect to be given
the responsibility of calculating damages, despite the fact that they heard
extensive testimony on this topic. They assumed that their only function was
to determine the defendant's liability. 28
Jurors in the second group generally agreed that it would have been
extremely difficult to calculate damages. 29 Despite judicial instructions on
damages that mentioned possible future losses, the impact of inflation, and a
discount formula, one of the alternate jurors assumed that the judge, rather
than the jury, would calculate damages.
Selvin and Picus 30 interviewed the jurors who decided an asbestos
products liability case in Texas in 1984. 31 From those interviews emerged the
picture of a well-intentioned jury that nonetheless awarded compensation for
expenses they were not to consider and that evaluated extra-legal factors
when determining punitive damages.
To compensate each of the four plaintiffs who had contracted some form
of asbestosis, the jury calculated and then summed past and future lost
earnings, medical expenses, and figures to compensate for pain and suffering.
These calculations were based on information about employment histories,
life expectancies, and medical expenses. Jurors used a process described as
"guesstimation" 32 to determine an amount for pain and suffering. Finally, to
calculate punitive damages, they evaluated each defendant's financial
resources and decided to assess $1 million against four of the ten defendants.
The largest damage award ever recorded came in 1985 from the twelve-
person jury that decided that Texaco interfered with Pennzoil's attempt to
acquire Getty Oil Company. 33 Two jurors-the foreman and another highly
25. A. AUSTIN, supra note 24.
26. 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1976), af'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977).
27. The first trial ended in a mistrial in November 1980 when the jury could not resolve a 5-1
deadlock in favor of the plaintiff. The second trial ended in October 1981 with a verdict for the
defense. A. AUSTIN, supra note 24, at 21.
28. Id. at 34-35.
29. Somejurors commented: "I think I would have floundered on that one"; "I don't know how
you come up with the amounts-I really don't know." Id. at 52.
30. Supra note 8.
31. Newman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. M-79-124-CA (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 1984). The
jury found each of ten defendants liable for the four plaintiffs' injuries and awarded a total of $3.9
million in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages against four of the ten
defendants. M. SELVIN & L. Picus, supra note 8, at v-vi.
32. M. SELVIN & L. Picus, supra note 8, at 38.
33. Thejury awarded Pennzoil $7.53 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion in punitive
damages; with prejudgment interest, the award totaled $11.2 billion. A Texas court of appeals
upheld the compensatory damages but reduced the punitive damages to $1 billion, calling that
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influential jury member-granted extensive interviews after the trial . 4
Although jutrors were concerned during deliberations about the potential size
of their compensatory damage award, they apparently felt they had little
choice.3 5 Texaco decided not to present any damages testimony. Thus, when
the jury considered the instructions to "not consider or discuss anything that
is not represented by the evidence in this case, ' 36 they felt they had no role in
fabricating a case for Texaco. The vote was 10-2.37
Punitive damages proved to be the most contentious issue discussed by the
jury. Six jurors wanted to assess punitive damages at $7.53 billion, and two
jurors held out at zero. The foreman persuaded one group to reduce its
assessment if another group would increase theirs. Finally, an influential
juror realized that the group needed a rationale-a formula of some kind-to
agree on punitive damages. The $3 billion figure eventually agreed upon
represented $1 billion against Texaco for each of the indemnities the jury had
awarded. That number was apparently a nearly perfect compromise between
the high and low figures that jurors had been arguing over. Thus, although
the damages in this case were arguably forty times larger than the largest
award in any prior case, descriptions of the deliberation process suggest that
the jury attempted to base its decision on the evidence it heard and on a
formulaic calculation of punitive damages . 3
Although interview data can illuminate the process of decisionmaking in
actual cases, they have certain shortcomings. Jurors may not accurately
remember or relate their experiences. Some jurors may not consent to be
interviewed. Generalization beyond the particular case is limited.39 Thus,
researchers have increasingly begun to study jury decisionmaking by staging a
trial for mock jurors and recording their deliberations either on audio or
videotape.
D. Mock Jury Studies
Mock jury studies permit researchers to manipulate those features of the
trial they wish to evaluate (for example, the identity of the defendant, or the
amount of money requested by the plaintiff's attorney), and present the same
trial via videotape to multiple juries. Thus, researchers are able to evaluate
how a large number of mock jurors-often college students but, increasingly,
jurors who have recently completed jury duty-react to the facts and legal
amount adequate under the circumstances. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
34. T. PETZINGER, supra note 24, at 483.
35. One juror commented: "The law entitled Pennzoil to all the damages necessary to make
itself whole, and Pennzoil had documented the number backward and forward. Pennzoil's damages
expert-an impressive witness, an unpaid witness!-had called the number 'conservative.' " Id. at
404.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 404-08.
39. See generally R. MACCOUN, supra note 10, at 8-9,
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issues of the case. More importantly, the procedure allows for recording and
subsequent analysis of the mock jurors' deliberations.
This methodology has been used to examine, among other things, the
impact on damage awards of the ad damnum (the amount requested by the
plaintiff); 40 the size of the plaintiff population;' 4 1 various kinds of verdict
forms; 42 the identity of the defendant; 43 the defendant's liability insurance;44
the means by which the plaintiff was injured;45 and the impact of expert
economic testimony. 46 The results of many of these studies will be described
in the sections that follow. In general, mock jury studies may be limited by
the fact that jurors know that the consequences of their decisions are not
binding and that their deliberations are being recorded or observed. 47
Subjects may select their words and arguments more carefully than they might
in a real trial and may be less likely to invest their time and mental energy in
the deliberation process. Still, mock jury studies allow for generalization
beyond a given group of jurors and can provide systematic evidence to
complement the anecdotal or statistical data collected by other means.
Provided that researchers exercise caution in generalizing from their studies
to real-world situations, mock jury research can provide useful clues about
ho'v jurors process information and make decisions. 48
IV
JURY DAMAGE AWARDS: WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED
A. Jurors May Fuse Liability and Compensatory Damage Issues
One view of the purpose for compensatory damages is that they are
intended to return the plaintiff to preinjury levels of functioning-to right the
wrongs inflicted by the defendant. 49 In theory, these awards should reflect
the plaintiff's circumstances and be independent of the defendant's moral
culpability. Stated otherwise, if the jury believes that a preponderance of the
evidence, however narrow, favors the plaintiff, they are to compensate for all
damages proved and not vary the award as a function of the fault of the
40. J. Zuehl, The Ad Damnum, Jury Instructions, and Personal Injury Damage Awards (Aug. 4,
1982) (unpublished manuscript).
41. Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 15.
42. E. Wiggins, Procedural Innovations to Enhance Juror Comprtehension in Complex
Litigation (1988) (unpublished manuscript).
43. Hans & Ermann, supra note 15; Wasserman & Robinson, supra note 15.
44. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, supra note 14, at 753-55.
45. Goodman, Greene & Loftus, supra note 15.
46. Raitz, Greene, Goodman & Loftus, supra note 15.
47. See generally Bray & Kerr, Use of the Simulation Method in the Study of Jury Behavior, 3 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 107 (1979); Vidmar, The Other Issues in juryt Simulation Research, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95
(1979); Weiten & Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm, 3 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 71
(1979).
48. R. MAcCOUN, supra note 10.
49. Kalven, supra note 4, at 160.
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defendant. 50 There is evidence, however, that liability issues may intrude in
discussions of compensatory damages. 5' Thus, damage awards may do more
than compensate the plaintiff; they may also reflect the jury's sentiments
about the defendant's culpability.
Broeder suggests that damage awards will generally vary with the strength
of the evidence against the defendant, rather than as a function of the
plaintiff's loss only. 52 Broeder had thirty mock juries view a negligence case
in which the plaintiff was injured in a collision with the defendant's
automobile. Broeder varied the liability of the defendant so that half the
juries viewed a case in which liability was very clear. For the other jurors,
liability was less clear. Injuries to the plaintiff remained constant for both
groups. The mean award in the first group was $41,000 and in the second,
$34,000. In this study, the weaker the proof on liability, the lower the
award. 53
More recently, Hans and Ermann used a mock jury setting to determine
whether jurors reacted differently to corporate and individual defendants in a
negligence case. 54 These researchers found that even when injuries to the
plaintiff were held constant and the actions of the defendants (corporate
versus individual) were identical, the corporation was more likely to be held
liable, and was judged to be more reckless and morally wrong in its behavior.
In line with the fusion of liability and damages, jurors awarded the plaintiff
more when the defendant was a corporation.
These studies suggest that sentiments about liability can linger beyond
discussion of this issue and can affect jurors' subsequent deliberations about
compensatory damages. However, another possibility must be considered.
Lloyd-Bostock suggests that the process may operate in the reverse direction:
that jurors' desires to compensate a needy plaintiff may influence their
willingness to find the defendant liable. 55 If factfinders decide that the
defendant can provide compensation, they may hold that defendant liable,
regardless of his or her actual culpability. Whether the influence operates in a
forward (that is, liability judgments influence damage awards) or backward
direction (that is, sentiments about damages affect liability judgments), the
effect is the same: The calculation of compensatory damages is not
50. Id. However, in states that still hold to the contributory negligence doctrine, the plaintiff
will lose the case if at fault to any degree. In these instances, the plaintiff's negligence-however
minimal-bars recovery. Id. at 168.
51. "If we imagine for a moment a series of cases in which the facts as to damages remain
identical but the facts as to liability range over the full and rich possibilities of negligence, the legal
view is that the award should be constant throughout the series. Thejury's view is that these may be
significantly different cases." Kalven, supra note 4, at 165-66.
52. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, supra note 14, at 753-54.
53. Id. at 754.
54. Hans & Ermann, supra note 15.
55. Lloyd-Bostock, Attributions of Cause and Responsibility as Social Phenomenon, in ATTRIBUTION
THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 261 (. Jaspars, F.
Fincham & M. Hewstone eds. 1983).
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independent of other considerations. Rather, the defendant's culpability is
factored into the equation.
B. Procedures Used to Calculate Damage Awards
1. The Simplest Case: Anchoring on a Suggested Figure. The ad damnum is the
sum requested by the plaintiff's attorney to compensate the plaintiff
adequately. Broeder suggests that the ad damnum does "yeoman service as a
kind of damage jumping-off place for the jurors." 56 He interviewed jurors in
eleven personal injury cases to determine whether the size of the ad damnum
influenced their damage awards. In six of seven cases in which the plaintiff
prevailed, damages were determined to some degree with reference to the ad
damnum. Broeder describes the case in which the ad damnum had its
greatest impact: The plaintiff was seeking $2400 for loss of the use of his
tractor, among other things. Jurors began their deliberations with a lengthy
discussion of the $2400 figure and eventually agreed to award half that
amount. One juror explained that "lawyers always ask for about twice what
they really expect." 57
This issue has also been studied in a mock jury setting. Zuehl had sixty-
nine juries watch a personal injury case in which the ad damnum was
systematically varied while the facts of the case were held constant. Different
groups of jurors were given suggested amounts of $10,000, $75,000,
$150,000, or "substantial compensation." 58 Data from the study suggest that
jurors used the ad damnum either as an anchor or as an upper boundary for
their awards because when an exact dollar figure was requested, half the
awards matched that figure. Further, jurors who did not match the suggested
amount tended to adjust downward from the ad damnum, 59 and compliance
with the figure decreased as the requested amount increased. The average
awards in the exact-request conditions were $18,000, $62,800, and $101,400.
Monetary awards suggested by expert economic witnesses in cases
involving personal injury, antitrust violation, trademark infringement, or
employment discrimination, for example, may also serve to anchor jurors'
damage awards. In fact, the expert's figures may have considerably more
impact than the ad damnum because of the perceived credibility and expertise
of the witness. 60
56. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, supra note 14, at 756.
57. Id. at 757.
58. Zuehl, supra note 40. This simulation was based on an actual case in which the jury awarded
$65,000. Thus, Zuehl anticipated that jurors who received the $75,000 request would be most likely
to endorse the ad damnum.
59. Only three juries exceeded the ad damnum and all three had received requests for only
$10,000. Id.
60. See, e.g., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982), in which a court reversed a
criminal sexual conduct conviction partially because an improper use of expert testimony created a
misleading "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness," and United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d
381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979), in which courts have expressed concern that jurors will be overly impressed
by an expert witness and will place undue weight on his or her testimony. See abo Eagly & Chaiken,
Cognitive Theories of Persuasion, in 17 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267 (L.
Berkowitz ed. 1984).
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This issue has been examined in a study by Raitz, Greene, Goodman, and
Loftus.6 1 They presented excerpts from transcripts of a wrongful termination
case to mock jurors and varied the presence of expert economic testimony.
One-third of the jurors heard no expert testimony. Thus, no figure was
suggested by the plaintiff as adequate compensation for past and future lost
wages. One-third heard testimony from an economist for the plaintiff who
suggested a $719,354 compensatory award. One-third were exposed to two
experts: an expert for the plaintiff who suggested $719,354 and an opposing
defense expert economist whose figures were based on slightly different
assumptions about salary increases, interest rates, and inflation and who
suggested $321,000.
Data from this study show that jurors relied on the experts' suggestions.
The median awards in these three conditions were $366,000, $700,000, and
$630,000, respectively. Further, when jurors were asked to describe how they
arrived at their decisions and their responses were analyzed, researchers
determined that 55 percent of jurors exposed to the plaintiff's expert
mentioned something about endorsing the expert's figure, and 66 percent of
jurors in the two-expert condition mentioned endorsing one of the experts'
figures. Thus, jurors often seem to anchor onto the damage awards suggested
by expert witnesses when faced with the difficult task of evaluating factors
such as worklife expectancy, the possibility for promotions, and exponential
salary increases. Under such conditions of uncertainty, the ad damnum and
the expert's request represent foundations from which jurors can begin their
deliberations. As their deliberations proceed, jurors often return to and
endorse these suggestions.
2. The Gestalt Approach. Searching for a Single Sum. Kalven suggests that "a
major characteristic of the jury's approach to damages . . . is that it does not
much concern itself with the damage components as an accountant might but
searches rather for a single sum that is felt to be appropriate.- 62 According to
Kalven, this holistic approach results because jurors are often presented with
a damages instruction that contains a long, complex sentence or two but that
does not suggest that jurors first derive a series of component sums.
Therefore, the damages awarded may reflect the jury's general sentiments
about the case and the parties involved, rather than an itemized accounting of
the plaintiff's losses.
Another possibility is that jurors might determine a single sum that they
believe represents adequate compensation and then work backwards to
apportion it into several categories. 63 Jurors may be more likely to use this
strategy if they are given a special verdict form requiring separate assessments
of loss to the plaintiff rather than a general verdict form. Although this
61. Supra note 15.
62. Kalven, supra note 4, at 161.
63. Id. at 162.
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method appears to give a result that is the sum of different damage
components, it is, in fact, premised on a single-sum assessment.
Are there data to support the contention that jurors search for a single
sum to compensate the plaintiff? In a word, no. Kalven suggests that his
assumption is based on the Chicago Jury Project findings, but he fails to
document instances of this gestalt-like reasoning in jurors. In fact, recent
interview and mock jury studies show something quite different than this
single-sum approach. This research suggests that jurors do assess various
components in a case (for example, medical expenses, economic losses, pain
and suffering) and add the component sums to arrive at a compensatory
award. 64
3. Adding Component Sums to Determine an Award. Jurors interviewed after a
toxic tort case described how they evaluated each component of each
plaintiff's complaint and computed a single-sum award only after making
these componential calculations. 65 Thus, for each of the four plaintiffs, jurors
calculated and then summed past and future lost earnings, past medical
expenses (even though the judge specifically instructed them not to consider
these), future medical expenses, and the cost of past and future pain and
suffering. Often, they determined amounts that they then applied to all of the
four plaintiffs. For example, they estimated all plaintiffs' past medical
expenses at $12,000 per year and future medical expenses at $15,000 per
year. The jury determined that each plaintiff should receive $6,000 per year
as compensation for past and future pain and suffering. 66 The findings
suggest that although these jurors did not deliver completely individualized
judgments, they did evaluate each plaintiff's case on its merits; more
importantly, they broke each complaint into its component parts, computed
an award for each component, and then summed the results.
Results of mock jury studies also support the hypothesis that juries reach
damage awards by adding component sums. Goodman, Greene, and Loftus
presented vignettes to jurors that described a wrongful death case involving
either medical malpractice, products liability, or negligence. 67 Jurors were
informed that liability had already been decided in favor of the plaintiff and
that their task was to award an appropriate amount in damages. Of particular
interest were the strategies jurors used to determine monetary damages.
Jurors wrote detailed accounts of the reasons for their awards and described
the process used to decide upon that amount. These responses were analyzed
for content and coded into one of five categories: (1) picked a fair and
reasonable amount without computation; (2) multiplied the plaintiff's
expected worklife by annual salary; (3) performed some multiplication and
64. See, e.g., M. SELVIN & L. Picus, supra note 8, at 55.
65. Id.
66. However, they reduced their computed award for one plaintiff when it became apparent that
their formula would result in a higher award for him-a younger, but less seriously ill worker-than
for the most seriously injured plaintiff. Id.
67. Goodman, Greene & Loftus, supra note 15, at 292-93.
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then adjusted the award by increasing the total; (4) performed some
multiplication and then adjusted the award by decreasing the total; (5)
performed some computation ahd also included some recognition of an
exponential growth factor (for example, inflation, salary raises, and
promotions).
If jurors used a single-sum approach, their responses would likely be
coded as "picked a fair number without apparent calculation." In fact, only
approximately 27 percent of responses fell into this category, suggesting that
most jurors utilized a somewhat more complicated technique. 68 Moreover, in
actual cases where jurors are given considerably more information to form the
basis for their award, even fewer jurors would be likely to adopt this strategy.
Goodman, Greene, and Loftus have other data to suggest that mock
jurors weigh component factors when determining an award. Subjects
reviewed a list of seventeen factors (for example, the decedent's age, loss of
companionship to decedent's spouse, impact of inflation) that might have
influenced their decisions and were asked to indicate which of these factors
they considered, even fleetingly. Approximately 80 percent ofjurors said they
considered the decedent's age; 90 percent listed the decedent's salary at the
time of the accident; and approximately 60 percent said they considered that
person's potential worklife. Other factors were mentioned less frequently: 58
percent listed emotional loss to the decedent's spouse; 26 percent said they
considered the impact of inflation, and 17 percent said they considered that
the plaintiff must pay attorney's fees incurred during the lawsuit. 69 Although
some jurors may have responded after the fact with what they believed were
appropriate answers, these sizeable percentages indicate that mock jurors
seem to take a variety of factors into account when deciding on a
compensatory award.
The result of a detailed, componential approach-as compared to a single-
sum assessment-would likely be an increase, rather than a decrease, in the
damage award. 70 Use of a special verdict form may force jurors to weigh
component items more explicitly because it requires them to consider factors
they might have otherwise overlooked. The result would likely be larger
compensatory awards to the plaintiff.7'
Recent research by Wiggins supports this assumption. 72 She evaluated
decisionmaking as a function of jury verdict forms by asking jurors to view a
defamation case and deliberate about damages. Jurors were given either a
general verdict form that asked them simply to find for the plaintiff or the
defendant and award the appropriate damages, or a special verdict form that
68. Id. at 298.
69. Id. at 301-04.
70. "If one seriously assesses the components in a case of any magnitude, they are likely to add
up to a surprisingly large figure. I take it this is one reason why the plaintiff bar sometimes expresses
a preference for the accountant type juror in a case where damages are substantial and well
documented." Kalven, supra note 4, at 161-62.
71. Id. at 162.
72. Wiggins, supra note 42.
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required them to answer several questions about the case. 73 Wiggins found
no differences in the total damages (compensatory plus punitive damages)
awarded as a function of the verdict forms, but did find differences in how the
awards were allocated: The percentage of the award allocated to
compensatory damages was larger for jurors with special verdict forms than
for jurors with general verdict forms.74 Apparently, explicit attention to
issues contended in the case causes jurors to increase the amount of
compensation they believe is owed the plaintiff, but does not cause them to
change what they believe is an appropriate overall sum.
4. The Effects of Deliberation. To what extent are individual jurors'
preferences prior to deliberation predictive of the group award on damages?
By what process do jurors reach an agreement on an award during
deliberations? How does the decision rule (that is, unanimity versus majority)
affect the process of compromise? Data on these issues are rudimentary and
somewhat confusing.
One possibility is that the damage award is simply the mean of jurors'
individual responses. Judge Frank has written that "[a]gain and again it has
been disclosed that ... [e]ach juror . . . writes down the amount he wants to
award, the total is added and the average is taken as a verdict." 75
Certain data support this position. In posttrial interviews with jurors in
thirty-eight federal civil trials in Philadelphia, Guinther determined that in 40
percent of the cases where jurors disagreed greatly on the amount to award in
damages, they averaged the suggested amounts to reach a result. 76 Another
researcher noted this phenomenon in mock jury studies, but observed that it
had occurred only as a last resort, after lengthy discussion failed to produce
an agreement. 77
Kalven suggests that jury awards are frequently close to the
predeliberation averages of the group members. 78 His data also indicate that
jurors agree to this form of compromise only after they have made serious
attempts to bridge their differences by alternative means. In other words, the
jury does not simply calculate the mean of twelve individual awards and
record that figure as a group verdict. The averaging method is used only
when other attempts at compromise have failed. Of course, this averaging
rule might accurately describe the final award even though the jury never
73. The questions included: "Did the plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant made a defamatory statement about her?"; "Did the plaintiff prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defamatory statement injured her?"; "Did the defendant
prove by a preponderance of evidence that the defamatory statement was true?". Id.
74. For jurors with a special verdict form, 73% of the award was allocated to compensatory
damages; for jurors with a general verdict form, only 54% went to compensatory damages. Id.
75. J. FRANK, supra note 3, at 114.
76. J. GUINTHER, supra note 8, at 97.
77. Id.
78. Kalven, supra note 4, at 177.
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explicitly calculated an average. 79 Further research is needed to determine
how explicit these compromises actually are.
A variant on the averaging model involves the calculation, either explicit
or otherwise, of a median, rather than mean award.8 0 A median award accounts
for alljurors' individual preferences, whereas a mean award may be skewed by
one or two extreme values. Data from Sonaike's mock jury study suggest that
the median of individual awards is a better measure of the group award than is
the mean.8' In this study, mock jurors watched videotapes of automobile
negligence cases, completed predeliberation questionnaires, and provided a
group verdict and damage award. Sonaike found that the group awards
tended to reflect the trend of predeliberation awards dominant within each
jury, thus supporting Kalven's notion about compromise. Sonaike concluded,
however, that the median, rather than the mean, was a better predictor of the
ultimate group award.
A slightly more complex possibility is that jurors' individual award
preferences do not carry equal weight during deliberations but instead are
influenced by the juror's prestige, persuasiveness, or involvement in the
deliberation. 2 More persuasive jurors will have more impact on the final
determination, and the extent of any juror's impact will be a function of his or
her social characteristics. This method of resolution-a weighted average
model-might be more likely to occur under unanimity than majority decision
rules because every juror's sentiments must be addressed in the former case
and thus individual strengths and weaknesses will manifest themselves.
Under a majority decision rule, the minority faction can essentially be
ignored. Majority and unanimity decision rules are discussed in some detail
below.
Studies have developed conflicting data on the effects of deliberation on
damage awards. As previously noted, Kalven s8 3 and Sonaike8 4 argue that
group awards tend to reflect individual jurors' predeliberation sentiments.
Several studies have found otherwise. Zuehl8 5 reported that the mean jury
award exceeded the mean predeliberation juror recommendations in all four
ad damnum conditions of his study. Similarly, Wasserman and Robinson8 "
found that postdeliberation jury awards were generally larger than
predeliberation individual awards. Finally, Kaplan and Miller8 7 had jurors
read a products liability case and give both prediscussion individual awards
and postdiscussion group awards for both compensatory and punitive
79. R. MACCOUN, supra note 10, at 33.
80. The median refers to that award in a distribution of awards above which and below which
one-half of the awards fall. The mean refers to the arithmetic average of all awards calculated by
summing all awards and dividing that amount by the total number of awards,
81. Sonaike, supra note 15, at 902-03.
82. R. MACCOUN, supra note 10, at 33.
83. Kalven, supra note 4, at 177.
84. Sonaike, supra note 15, at 904.
85. Zuehl, supra note 40.
86. Wasserman & Robinson, supra note 15, at 147-48.
87. Kaplan & Miller, supra note 15, at 308-09.
Page 225: Autumn 1989]
LAW AND CONrEMPORARY PROBLEMS
damages. They found a substantial increase in the amounts of
postdeliberation awards for punitive damages only; group awards for
compensatory damages did not differ from individual, prediscussion amounts.
These findings suggest that the situation is more complicated than previously
believed: For certain decisions, such as compensation, group awards may
reflect individual awards, while for other decisions, such as punishment, this
relationship may not operate.
Kaplan and Miller suggest that these findings can be explained in part by
the kinds of information that jurors shared as they discussed these two issues.
Jurors' discussions of compensatory damages included references to trial
testimony and inferences drawn from the evidence, whereas discussions of
punishment involved value statements and conformity pressure. The
researchers further suggest that the particular decision rule used in the case
may have exerted some influence on its outcome.88
Evidence for the significance of the decision rule comes from data
collected by Judge Forer and described by Guinther. 9 In determining
liability, unanimous-verdict juries who deliberated in Judge Forer's
courtroom were more likely than majority-verdict juries to find for the
plaintiff. However, according to Judge Forer, when the jury erred on the
amount of the award, unanimous-verdict juries' awards often were too low,
while majority juries erred on the high side.
By means of posttrial interviews, Guinther 90 was able to evaluate more
systematically the role of the decision rule in contributing to these disparate
awards. According to Guinther, three scenarios can develop when unanimity
is required. First, in the course of deliberation, all jurors may agree on a
verdict for the plaintiff and then proceed to discuss the award by evaluating
the evidence relevant to damages; second, there may be no agreement on
liability but the majority favors the plaintiff; and third, jurors may not agree
on liability, but the majority favors the defense. In the second and third
scenarios, the damages figure can become the barter that eventually allows the
majority to accommodate the views of the minority. So, for example, when
the proplaintiff faction is in the majority, it may obtain the concessions from
the defense minority necessary to allow the plaintiff to prevail on the issue of
liability by lowering the amount it wishes to award in damages. When the
opposite situation arises, the prodefense forces may eventually allow a
plaintiff's verdict, but only if the plaintiff-minority agrees to a reduced
damages award. In both cases, the result is that the plaintiff wins, but receives
a lower award.
In juries where only majority agreement is required, these compromises
come into play only when the vote is relatively evenly split. Otherwise, the
majority forces need pay little heed to the minority position. Thus, when the
majority favors the plaintiff, they need not lower the amount they want to
88. Id.
89. J. GUINTHER, supra note 8.
90. Id. at 96.
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award in order to extract concessions from the defense-minority. As a result,
the plaintiff receives more money.
In 54 percent of the cases he studied in which a unanimous verdict was
required and the plaintiff prevailed, the data suggest the majority agreed to
reduce their award in order to obtain agreement from the defense-minority.
In jurisdictions that used a five/six rule,9' such reduction occurred only 33
percent of the time.92
The data on the effects of deliberation suggest that jurors' discussions
about damages can be complex and motivated by subtle attempts at
persuasion and compromise. They further suggest that jurors do not
routinely average their awards and compromise on the mean. Rather, jurors
attempt other forms of conciliation, including subtle compromise on damages
in order to reach consensus on liability. Only when these methods fail do
jurors revert to the simpler averaging technique. The data also suggest that
different processes may operate and different information may be exchanged
when jurors discuss compensatory as opposed to punitive damages.
C. The Impact of "Silent Factors": Attorneys' Fees, Taxation, Insurance,
and Prejudgment Interest
Jury instructions are often silent on the topics of attorneys' fees, the
taxability of damage awards, plaintiffs' and defendants' insurance, and
prejudgment interest used to compensate plaintiffs for the delay prior to the
receipt of an award. Jurors are typically given no information about whether
they should or should not consider these factors; however, evidence is
accumulating that jurors do discuss these issues during their deliberations.9 3
1. Attorneys' Fees. In theory, jurors are not to award fees for counsel as part
of the plaintiff's compensation; 94 however, jurors often discuss fees in their
deliberation and see no impropriety in doing so. 95 One-quarter of the mock
jurors questioned by Goodman, Greene, Loftus, and Raitz said that they
contemporaneously considered the payment of attorneys' fees as they decided
on a compensatory award in a wrongful termination case.96 These jurors
would likely raise the issue during deliberations. Additionally, jurors are
91. That is, five of six jurors must agree.
92. J. GUINTHER, supra note 8, at 82.
93. See, e.g., J. GUINTHER, supra note 8, at 97; M. SELVIN & L. Picus, supra note 8, at 55; Broeder,
The University of ChicagoJury Project, supra note 14, at 751; Erlanger,Jur
, 
Research in America: Its Past and
Future, 4 LAW & Soc'y REV. 345, 350 (1970); Hammitt, Carroll & Relies, supra note 20, at 755.
94. This issue has been contended at the appellate level. In Renaurt Lumber Yards, Inc. v.
Levine, 49 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1950), the court decided that a $75,000 damages award was excessive,
estimated that $30,000 of the award covered pain and suffering, and ordered a remittitur. In dissent,
Justice Hobson argued "although there is no legal basis for the inclusion of an attorney's fee in the
judgment it is a matter of common knowledge that in personal injury actions lawyers do not
customarily perform services gratuitously. As a practical proposition it is indeed probable that after
paying for the services of his attorney appellee would have little, if any, of the $30,000 left." Id. at
102 (Hobson, J., dissenting).
95. Kalven, supra note 16, at 1069.
96. Raitz, Greene, Goodman & Loftus, supra note 15.
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relatively well informed about the usual one-third contingency
arrangement.9 7
According to Kalven, the importance of this issue varies inversely with the
difficulty of assessing damages. 98 His data suggest that in cases where
damages are easy to define and compensation levels are uncontroverted, the
jury is not apt to discuss attorneys' fees. In cases where jurors disagree about
an appropriate level of compensation, discussion of attorneys' fees is more
common. Kalven suggests that discussion of fees acts as a device to facilitate
agreement during deliberation. Often, the issue is raised in an attempt to
persuade a reluctant juror to raise the amount he or she is willing to award.99
Do jurors routinely add to the award to cover the payment of attorneys'
fees? Kalven would argue that they do not. I0 0 Some recent empirical data
suggest that they do."1 ' Jurors interviewed in an asbestos case indicated that
they added approximately 40 percent to the computed award to cover
attorneys' fees. 10 2 Thus, although the jury was instructed to consider "the
following elements of damage, and none other," 0 3 and the topic of attorneys'
fees was never mentioned in court, jurors in this case apparently did not
hesitate to increase their award to reflect payment of counsel's fees. 10 4
It is difficult to determine whether these anecdotal reports are
representative of most juries' experiences on this issue. Jurors questioned
about their discussions of attorneys' fees may hesitate to divulge such
information, believing that by discussing this issue they may have acted
against the court's orders. However, given the evidence from several studies,
jurors apparently often discuss contingency fee structures, and they
occasionally adjust their damage awards with this factor in mind.
2. The Plaintiff's Insurance. Guinther assessed the role of insurance in
jurors' decisions in interviews with jurors subsequent to federal civil trials.
When jurors were asked if they personally considered that the plaintiff might
97. Eighty-four percent of jurors questioned by Guinther said that a plaintiff typically pays his
lawyer a percentage of the total verdict. J. GUINTHER, supra note 8, at 331.
98. Kalven, supra note 16, at 1069.
99. In one of the experimental jury deliberations there was a sharp split in the jury over the
damages. The majority faction favored $35,000, and the minority $25,000. After considerable
discussion the impasse seemed firm. Finally, one of the majority raised the fee issue for the first time
and reminded the holdouts that the plaintiff would have to pay his lawyer. The holdouts agreed that
this was a point they had not previously considered and yielded rather rapidly. An overly logical
member of the majority then raised the point that in reaching their figure of $35,000 they had not
considered fees either. He was summarily silenced by the other majority jurors, and a verdict of
$35,000 was unanimously agreed upon. Id. at 1070.
100. Id. at 1069.
101. M. SELVIN & L. Picus, supra note 8, at 55.
102. One juror remarked:
He just got $572,000 and had to give the lawyer half of it, then he wouldn't have the money
that maybe he needs for his medical expenses for the rest of the time he's going to be alive,
and I didn't think ... that he should have to pay out of his pocket for hiring a lawyer to take
the company to court.
Id. at 38-39.
103. Id. at 74.
104. Id.
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have either medical insurance or workmen's compensation to cover part or all
of the injury expenses, 29 percent acknowledged that they had. However, less
than 10 percent said that this belief had any impact on their award and less
than 2 percent said that it had substantially affected their decision. '0 5
In contrast, when asked whether the jury as a whole acted on that belief, 13
percent ofjurors said their jury lowered the award because they believed the
plaintiff had part or all of his or her injuries covered by other sources. 10 6
Because the judge's charge did not mention this consideration, jurors may
have been reluctant to admit that they individually considered the plaintiff's
insurance. Still, only occasionally did they reduce their awards because of
their beliefs about the plaintiff's insurance.
3. The Defendant's Liability Insurance. The possibility that the defendant is
insured is also considered by the jury during deliberations about damages. 0 7
In general, if jurors believe a defendant is insured, they will often return a
higher award.' 08 Fifty-four percent of jurors questioned by Guinther said
they considered that the defendant carried insurance. 10 9 However, like
attorneys' fees, this factor may have its greatest impact in controversial cases
in which some members of the jury convince others to increase their awards
because the insured defendant can afford to pay and will not be seriously
injured by a sizeable judgment.' 10
Some evidence suggests that if the topic of insurance is mentioned at trial
and the jurors are instructed to disregard that information, they will return a
higher award than jurors who do not consider insurance."' The instruction
to disregard seems to sensitize jurors to the insurance issue and causes them
to award the plaintiff more.
Broeder studied thirty mock juries in automobile negligence cases. One-
third of the jurors were given no information about insurance; their mean
compensatory award was $33,000. One-third were told about the insurance
but given no instruction to disregard this information; their mean award was
$37,000. The final third were given information about insurance as well as an
instruction to disregard that information; their mean award was $46,000.112
This finding fits with data suggesting that jurors in criminal trials are
influenced by information they have been instructed to disregard.' ' :
105. J. GUINTHER, supra note 8, at 98.
106. Id. at 74.
107. Erlanger, supra note 93, at 350.
108. Hans & Ermann, supra note 15, at 157.
109. J. GUINTHER, supra note 8, at 98.
110. Erlanger, supra note 93, at 350.
Ill. Broeder, The Universitv of Chicagojury Project, supra note 14, at 754.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated
Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q 235, 237 (1976): Thompson, Fong & Rosenhan, Inadmissible Evidence and Juror
Verdicts, 40J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 453, 457-62 (1981).
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4. The Taxability of Damage Awards. Compensatory awards made to plaintiffs
in personal injury and wrongful death cases are generally not taxed.' 1 4
Conversely, punitive damage awards and damages to replace lost wages or
lost profits represent taxable income. The question whether juries should be
instructed as to the taxability of damages awarded is an ongoing
controversy.i i 5 At this point, exceedingly little is known about the role of tax
considerations in jury deliberations. Goodman, Greene, and Loftus asked
mock jurors in wrongful death cases to indicate the legal and extra-legal
factors they considered in deciding on a damages award. Only 11 percent of
them mentioned issues relating to taxation.' 16
5. Prejudgment Interest. The majority of states allow plaintiffs in personal
injury cases to receive prejudgment interest to compensate them for the delay
between the accident and the time of recovery.' 17 Some juries add a sum to
the award to reflect the interest the plaintiff would have earned on money that
went instead to cover medical expenses.' " What happens in states without
this provision? Do jurors intuitively consider the impact of a delay when
deciding on a compensatory award?
The answer appears to be yes. Data show that in jurisdictions without
prejudgment interest statutes, jurors award extra compensation to plaintiffs
whose cases take longer to reach trial.' 9 Hammitt, Carroll, and Relles
surmise that juries do not explicitly increase their award to compensate for a
delay' 20 (as did jurors in the asbestos case in order to cover. attorneys'
fees' 21 ). Rather, they evaluate the monetary damages in current, rather than
in accident-year dollars. With inflation, prejudgment interest is implicitly
built into their calculations. 122 One caveat is in order: Hammit, Carroll, and
Relles did not directly evaluate the processes of decisionmaking in these cases,
but evaluated the outcomes of deliberation. Therefore, any conclusions about
actual procedures used by juries to deal with this issue must necessarily be
speculative.
114. Note, Instructing the Jury on the Taxability of Their Awards-But First, How Are They Taxed?, 9 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 299, 299 (1985).
115. See, e.g., Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1981) (court upheld a trial
court decision not to allow a jury instruction with respect to income taxes); Otis Elevator Co. v. Reid,
706 P.2d 1378, 1382 (Nev. 1985) (court held that tax instructions are appropriate only when tax-
related issues in a case increase the likelihood that the jury will consider the tax consequences). Cf
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 497 (1980), in which the Court favored an instruction
on the rationale that the average juror would probably assume an award was taxable not being
"aware of the special statutory exception for personal injury awards." The Court argued that
without this information, jurors would inflate any award to allow for tax effects and that the
instruction would "merely eliminate an area of doubt or speculation." Id. at 498.
116. Goodman, Greene & Loftus, supra note 15, at 303.
117. Hammitt, Carroll & Relies, supra note 20, at 758.
118. RAND CORPORATION, REPORT ON THE FIRST FOUR YEARS 21 (1984).
119. Hammitt, Carroll & Relies, supra note 20, at 759.
120. Id. at 761.
121. M. SELVIN & L. Picus, supra note 8, at 38-39.
122. Hammitt, Carroll & Relies, supra note 20, at 761.
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Overall, however, jurors apparently often discuss factors on which the
judge's instructions were silent: contingency fees, insurance, taxation, and
interest payments. These factors are likely to influence the deliberations
when the jury is unable to reach a consensus. Jurors apparently raise these
silent issues in order to persuade their colleagues to increase (in the case of
contingency fees or interest payments) or decrease (when the plaintiff is
insured) their awards. Unfortunately, few studies have assessed these
possibilities, so it is difficult to know whether jurors' discussions of the silent
issues reflect correct understanding of the law or misinformed hunches.
V
CONCLUSION
How able are juries to compensate plaintiffs for their injuries? Are juries
unpredictable and capricious in their decisionmaking? Or do damage awards
reflect responsible and rational deliberation processes?
The few studies that have evaluated this issue lead to somewhat
contradictory conclusions about the processes used to determine damage
awards. This inconsistency, combined with the nascent state of the research,
suggests that there are no simplistic responses to these queries. However, it is
probably safe to assert that in cases where damages are uncontroverted and
jury consensus is reached without difficulty, jurors will probably
compartmentalize their discussion and consider evidence relevant to various
damages discussed at trial (for example, medical expenses, lost wages) rather
than use a single-sum approach. Self-report data from jurors suggest that
when they determine individual, predeliberation awards, most employ some
form of calculation rather than endorse what seems to be a reasonable figure.
Further, juries in these cases are likely to reach a consensus by informally
considering the range of preferred responses and deriving a figure on which
jurors can agree, rather than by explicitly calculating an average or mean
award. According to some studies, the figure eventually agreed upon is often
close to the amount requested by the plaintiff. (Recall, of course, that jurors
deliberating about damages typically will have just concluded their
discussions on liability with a decision in favor of the plaintiff.) Other studies
suggest that the agreed-upon amount is close to, or greater than (but
apparently not less than) jurors' predeliberation awards.
In cases involving more complex evidence or evidence based on uncertain
information (for example, expert medical, scientific, or economic testimony-
especially if presented by opposing expert witnesses), and in cases in which
jurors cannot easily reach a consensus, a different set of decisionmaking
processes may operate. Here, jurors may anchor on an amount suggested by
one side or the other,' 23 rather than attempt to perform detailed and
complicated calculations themselves. Some jurors may consider the silent
factors of contingency fees, insurance, taxation, and interest payments when
123. T. PETZINGER, supra note 24, at 403-04.
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attempting to extract concessions from others. A requirement that the jury
reach a unanimous verdict seems to increase the probability that it will discuss
these silent factors.
Although very little is known about the ways that jurors determine punitive
or exemplary damages, this decision probably involves processes somewhat
different from those used to award compensatory damages. Often, jurors
have less information relevant to punitive damages than to compensatory
damages. For example, in negligence cases, the plaintiff may provide an
extremely detailed accounting of his or her medical expenses and losses
related to the injury, but may present little or no evidence to inform the jury's
decisions about punishment and deterrence. In other cases, the plaintiff may
present evidence of the defendant's ability to pay. In both instances, the jury
is accorded vast freedom to impose punishment on the defendant and to
attempt to deter others, and is often unguided even as to ballpark figures.
Another reason that punitive damage assessments may not mirror
compensatory award calculations is that the determination to punish or to
deter is decidedly different from the decision to compensate, because it is
motivated by different concerns. One study has shown that discussions about
punitive damages are more likely to involve normative, value-laden judgments
than references to the evidence presented at trial. 124 This suggests that the
process of awarding punitive damages may be driven less by the evidence
considered than by the verdict reached,' 25 and that these discussions may be
more wide-ranging than is true of compensatory calculations. In fact, it is not
clear that jurors routinely calculate punitive damages. Interestingly, punitive
awards are often of rounded numbers such as $100,000, $500,000 or $1
million, suggesting that little calculating may actually take place. Instead,
jurors may be more likely to agree on an amount by a process of negotiation:
Members of one group raise their award if members of another group lower
theirs. Apparently, only if this type of consensus fails will jurors compute an
average or mean punitive award.
Are jurors acting responsibly and rationally in these decisions? It is
probably too early to know. We do know that juries are occasionally biased
against corporate defendants and that they may fuse their sentiments about
liability with decisions about damages. We also know that juries occasionally
consider factors they had been instructed not to evaluate. On the other hand,
it is clear that jurors' reasoning is much more involved and sophisticated than
the single-sum approach entails. It is also clear that when unanimity is
required, most jurors' opinions are considered and the resulting award often
reflects the sentiments of the entire panel. What is perhaps most clear,
however, is that our understanding of these issues is in an extremely
rudimentary stage and that firm conclusions about the processes involved in
damage award determinations will simply have to await the accumulation of
evidence.
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